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We study von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets for one-to-one matching problems
under the assumption of coalitional sovereignty, meaning that a deviating coalition
of players does not have the power to arrange the matches of agents outside the
coalition. We study both the case of pairwise and coalitional deviations. We argue
further that dominance has to be replaced by path dominance along the lines of van
Deemen (1991) and Page and Wooders (2009). This results in the pairwise myopic
vNM set and the myopic vNM set, respectively. We obtain a unique prediction for
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1 Introduction
In the one-to-one matching model known as the marriage problem, there are two disjoint
sets of agents, say men and women. The problem is to match agents from one side of
the market with agents from the other side, whereas each agent also has the possibility of
remaining single. We refer to Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a comprehensive overview
on two-sided matching problems.
For marriage problems, stability is considered to be a central property. A matching is
stable if each agent on one side is matched with an acceptable agent on the other side and
no two agents of di↵erent sides would prefer to be matched to each other rather than to
stick to their current situation. For marriage markets, this stability notion is known to be
equivalent to core stability.
A matching is in the core if there is no subset of agents who, by forming only part-
nerships among themselves, can all obtain a strictly preferred outcome. Gale and Shapley
(1962) have shown that the core of a marriage problem is non-empty. Although elements of
the core have the property that they are stable once reached, it depends on the underlying
environment whether it is possible to reach some core element from any initial situation.
Stable sets as defined in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) address this concern.
A stable set is a set of outcomes that satisfies internal and external stability. As argued
by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), p. 41, a stable set describes the “established
order of society” or “accepted standard of behavior.” Internal stability “expresses the fact
that the standard of behavior is free from inner contradictions”. External stability “can
be used to discredit any non-conforming procedure”.
vNM stable sets are crucially dependent on the concept of dominance. Under the
standard definition, a matching is dominated by another matching if there is a coalition
such that all its members prefer the latter matching to the former and no coalition member
has a partner outside the coalition. A set of matchings is a vNM stable set if it satisfies
the conditions of internal and external stability with respect to this dominance relation.
Internal stability requires that no matching inside the set is dominated by a matching
belonging to the set. External stability imposes that any matching outside the set is
dominated by some matching belonging to the set. Ehlers (2007) has shown that for one-
to-one matching problems, the set of matchings in the core is a subset of any vNM stable
set and a vNM stable set can contain matchings outside the core. The vNM stable set may
not be unique.
The standard dominance relation used to define vNM stable sets violates the assumption
of coalitional sovereignty, the property that an objecting coalition cannot enforce matches
between members outside the coalition. Recently, Ray and Vohra (2015) have criticized
the standard definition of the vNM stable set for non-transferable utility games because it
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denies coalitional sovereignty of players outside the objecting coalition. Exactly the same
criticism applies to one-to-one matching problems.
A further criticism of the standard definition of the vNM stable set is that it does not
take into account that a deviation by a coalition can be followed by further deviations.
This corresponds to the well-known critique by Harsanyi (1974) to the vNM stable set. We
will follow the approach by van Deemen (1991) and Page and Wooders (2009), which takes
into account that if a matching is blocked by some coalition and the resulting matching is
not in the stable set itself, then further deviations will take place. This observation leads
Van Deemen (1991) to define the generalized stable set for abstract systems and Page and
Wooders (2009) to define the stable set with respect to path dominance. We show by
means of a simple example that not allowing for path dominance in one-to-one matching
problems leads to highly undesirable conclusions. External and internal stability as defined
by path dominance also corresponds to the myopic blocking dynamics as introduced by
Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets and by Jackson and Watts (2002) for
network formation problems.
For one-to-one matching problems, the dominance relation satisfying coalitional sovereignty
is defined in a straightforward way. If a coalition deviates, then it is free to form any match
between its members, it cannot a↵ect existing matches between members outside the coali-
tion, and previous matches between coalition and non-coalition members are destroyed.
Using the path dominance relation to define internal and external stability, now referred
to as myopic internal stability and myopic external stability, leads to the concept of the
myopic vNM set. Since in matching theory it is also often assumed that only pairwise
deviations are feasible, we also define the concept of the pairwise myopic vNM set in an
analogous way.
Since the myopic and the pairwise myopic vNM sets are based on paths of deviations
resulting from the direct dominance relation, we use the adjective myopic. An alternative
would be a farsighted approach based on the indirect dominance relation as introduced in
Harsanyi (1974) and further developed in Chwe (1994). The von Neumann-Morgenstern
farsighted stable sets have been characterized in Mauleon, Vannetelbosch, and Vergote
(2011) as the singleton core elements.
We show that there is a unique myopic vNM and a unique pairwise myopic vNM set and
that both sets coincide with the core. Although, as shown by Ehlers (2007), the core may
not be a vNM stable set under the standard definition of the direct dominance relation,1
it turns out to be the unique prediction when coalitional sovereignty and path dominance
is taken into account.
1There are not so many classes of games where the core is the unique vNM stable set of the game. One
example of such a class is the class of convex games, see Shapley (1971).
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An alternative to myopic vNM sets consists of an adaptation of the level-1 farsighted set
of Herings, Mauleon and Vannelbosch (2014) to one-to-one matchings problems. Herings,
Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2014) define this notion for network formation problems
and also allow for higher levels of farsightedness. The definition of the level-1 farsighted
set requires level-1 external stability as well as level-1 deterrence of external deviations,
and considers a minimal set of matchings satisfying these two properties. Level-1 external
stability is equivalent to pairwise myopic external stability. Level-1 deterrence of external
deviations requires that there is no pairwise myopic improvement from a matching inside
the level-1 farsighted set to a matching outside the set. The minimality requirement can
also be viewed as a requirement of internal stability, see also Myerson and Weibull (2015)
on this point of view.
Contrary to vNM stable sets, level-1 farsighted sets can be shown to exist under quite
general assumptions. For one-to-one matching problems, they again yield the core as the
unique prediction. The same prediction follows if the level-1 farsighted set is based on
general coalitional deviations rather than pairwise deviations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces one-to-one matching problems
and standard notions of stability. Section 3 defines and characterizes both the myopic
and the pairwise myopic vNM set. Section 4 studies the level-1 farsighted set. Section 5
concludes.
2 One-to-One Matching Problems
A one-to-one matching problem consists of a finite set of individuals N, partitioned into a
set of men M and a set of women W . The set of non-empty subsets of N is denoted by N .
Each individual i 2 N has a complete and transitive preference ordering  iover the agents
on the other side of the market and the prospect of being alone. Preferences are assumed
to be strict. Let  = (( m)m2M , ( w)w2W ) be a preference profile. We write m  w m0 if
woman w strictly prefers m to m0. Similarly, we write w  m w0 if man m strictly prefers
w to w0. A one-to-one matching problem is a triple (M,W, ).
A matching is a function µ : N ! N satisfying the following properties:
(i) For every m 2M , µ(m) 2 W [ {m}.
(ii) For every w 2 W , µ(w) 2M [ {w}.
(iii) For every i 2 N , µ(µ(i)) = i.
The set of all matchings is denoted by M. Given a matching µ, individual i 2 N is
said to be unmatched or single if µ(i) = i. A matching µ is individually rational if each
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agent is acceptable to his or her mate, so for every i 2 N it holds that µ(i)  i i or µ(i) = i.
A matching µ that is not individually rational can be blocked by an individual with an
unacceptable partner. For a given matching µ, a pair {m,w} is said to form a blocking
pair if w and m are not matched to one another but prefer one another to their mates at
µ, i.e. w  m µ(m) and m  w µ(w). A matching µ is stable if it is not blocked by any
individual or any pair of agents.
For every i 2 N, we extend the preference  i over the agent’s potential partners to
the set of matchings in the following way. We say that agent i prefers the matching µ0 to
the matching µ if µ0(i)  i µ(i) and we write µ0  i µ. A coalition S 2N is said to block
a matching µ 2 M if there exists a matching µ0 2 M such that µ0(S) = S and µ0  S µ,
where µ0  S µ is defined as µ0(i)  i µ(i) for every i 2 S. Such a matching µ0 is said to
dominate the matching µ via S. The set of all such matchings is denoted by fS(µ), so
fS(µ) = {µ0 2M | µ0(S) = S and µ0  S µ}.
We say that the matching µ0 dominates the matching µ if there is a coalition S 2 N such
that µ0 dominates the matching µ via S and we denote the set of all such matchings by
f(µ), so
f(µ) = [S2NfS(µ).
The core C of the matching problem (M,W, ) consists of all matchings that are not
blocked by any coalition, so
C = {µ 2M | f(µ) = ;}.
It has been shown by Gale and Shapley (1962) that the core of a matching problem is
non-empty. Also, a matching is stable if and only if it is not blocked by a coalition of size
one or two and if and only if it belongs to the core, see Theorem 3.3 in Roth and Sotomayor
(1990).
We next present the standard definition of a von Neumann Morgenstern (vNM) stable
set as introduced in von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) when applied to matching
problems.
Definition 1. A set of matchings V ⇢M is a vNM stable set if it satisfies:
(i) Internal stability: For every µ, µ0 2 V , it holds that µ0 /2 f(µ).
(ii) External stability: For every µ 2M\ V , it holds that f(µ) \ V 6= ;.
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A set of matchings is a vNM stable set if it satisfies internal and external stability.
Internal stability requires that no matching inside the vNM stable set is dominated by a
matching belonging to the vNM stable set. External stability states that any matching
outside the vNM stable set is dominated by some matching that belongs to the vNM stable
set.
As for the definition of the core, there is no loss of generality to restrict attention to
coalitions of size one and two when formulating internal and external stability or to restrict
attention to pairwise deviations. It is immediate that the core is contained in any vNM
stable set. However, since the core may not satisfy external stability, it may not be a vNM
stable set itself.
Given two matchings µ, µ0 2M, let µ _ µ0 : N ! N be the function defined by
(µ _ µ0)(m) = max m{µ(m), µ0(m)}, m 2M,
(µ _ µ0)(w) = min w{µ(w), µ0(w)}, w 2 W.
Similarly, we define µ ^ µ0 : N ! N as
(µ ^ µ0)(m) = min m{µ(m), µ0(m)}, m 2M,
(µ ^ µ0)(w) = max w{µ(w), µ0(w)}, w 2 W.
In general, the functions µ _ µ0 and µ ^ µ0 need not be matchings.
A set X ⇢M of matchings is a lattice if for every µ, µ0 2 X it holds that µ_µ0 2 X and
µ ^ µ0 2 X. The set X is a distributive lattice if X is a lattice and for every µ, µ0, µ00 2 X
it holds that
µ _ (µ0 ^ µ00) = (µ _ µ0) ^ (µ _ µ00),
µ ^ (µ0 _ µ00) = (µ ^ µ0) _ (µ ^ µ00).
Knuth (1976) has shown that the core C of a matching problem is a distributive lattice.
Ehlers (2007) has shown that V is a vNM stable set only if V is a maximal set satisfying
C ⇢ V , V is a distributive lattice, and the set of single agents is the same for every element
of V . Moreover, V is a vNM stable set if V is the unique maximal set satisfying C ⇢ V ,
V is a distributive lattice, and the set of single agents is the same for every element of V .
Thus, a vNM stable set V contains the core but can also contain matchings outside the
core.
3 Myopic vNM Sets
Ray and Vohra (2015) express the following criticism towards the vNM stable set for non-
transferable utility games: the enforceability condition embedded in the definition of the
dominance relation of vNM stable sets denies the coalitional sovereignty of players outside
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the objecting coalition. When adapted to matchings, their objection is as follows. Since in
the formulation of the vNM stable set using the dominance relation f, a coalition S 2 N
can impose any matching as long as its restriction to S is feasible for S, the objecting
coalition is given implicitly the power to arrange the matchings of players outside the
coalition, which is clearly undesirable.
In the following, we adapt the dominance relation in such a way that coalitional
sovereignty of players outside the objecting coalition is respected. Contrary to the dom-
inance relation f, it may now matter whether the size of the objecting coalition is un-
restricted or takes place by individuals and blocking pairs. We therefore formulate two
dominance relations.
Assume first that we do not restrict the size of the objecting coalition. In order to
respect the coalitional sovereignty property, the blocking of a matching µ 2 M by a
coalition S 2 N should result in a matching µ0 such that the players i 2 µ(S) \ S become
single, whereas the players in N \(S[µ(S)) are not a↵ected by this blocking.2 We therefore
restrict attention to matchings µ0 with this feature and define the set of matchings that
dominate µ via S as follows:
gS(µ) = {µ0 2M | µ0(S) = S,
for every i 2 µ(S) \ S, µ0(i) = i,
for every i 2 N \ (S [ µ(S)), µ0(i) = µ(i),
µ0  S µ}.
It clearly holds that gS(µ) ⇢ fS(µ). The set of matchings that dominate µ is now defined
as follows:
g(µ) = [S2N gS(µ).
We refer to an element of g(µ) as a myopic improvement.
In matching theory it is typical to restrict blocking to individuals and blocking pairs.
Let some matching µ 2M be given. An individual i 2 N can destroy his match with player
µ(i) whenever µ(i) 6= i. The players in N \ {i, µ(i)} are not a↵ected by the destruction of
this match, so remain matched to the same partner. The resulting matching is denoted by
µ0 = µ  (i, µ(i)).
A blocking pair (m,w) can destroy their existing matches, if any, and form a match
between them. The players in N \ {m,w, µ(m), µ(w)} are not a↵ected by the formation
of such a match, so keep their existing partners. The resulting matching is denoted by
µ0 = µ+ (m,w).
2Notice that this enforceability condition is similar to the enforceability condition defined in Roth and
Sotomayor (1990).
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Let some matching µ 2 M and some coalition S 2 N with S = {i} for some i 2 N
or S = {m,w} with m 2 M and w 2 W be given. We define the set of matchings that
dominate µ via S as follows:
hS(µ) =
(
{µ0 2M | µ0 = µ  (i, µ(i)) and i  i µ(i)}, S = {i},
{µ0 2M | µ0 = µ+ (m,w), w  m µ(m), and m  w µ(w)}, S = {m,w}.
Observe that for singleton coalitions S it holds that hS(µ) = gS(µ) and for coalitions S
consisting of a man and a woman we have hS(µ) ⇢ gS(µ). In the latter case, inequality
may result because under hS it is not allowed that m and w destroy their current match
without forming a new one together. Notice that in all cases, hS(µ) is either the empty set
or a singleton. We define the set of matchings that dominate µ as follows:
h(µ) =
 [i2Nh{i}(µ)  [  [(m,w)2M⇥Wh{m,w}(µ)  .
We refer to an element of h(µ) as a pairwise myopic improvement.
Although it might be tempting to define the vNM stable set by replacing f(µ) by either
g(µ) or h(µ) in Definition 1, the following example shows this to be problematic.
Example 1. Consider a matching problem (M,W, ), where M = {m1,m2}, W =
{w1, w2}, and the preferences of the individuals are as follows.
m1 m2
w1 w1
w2 w2
m1 m2
w1 w2
m1 m2
m2 m1
w1 w2
We represent a matching µ by the set of (m,w) pairs that are matched in µ. There is a
single stable matching µ⇤ = {(m1, w1),(m2, w2)}. The core has µ⇤ as its unique element.
For every µ 2M such that µ 6= µ⇤ we have that µ⇤ 2 f(µ). It now follows easily that there
is a unique vNM stable set Vf and that this set is equal to the core, Vf = C = {µ⇤}.
However, according to the dominance relation g, the matching µ⇤ does not dominate
the matching µ0 = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1)}. Indeed, only the grand coalition N can enforce the
matching µ⇤ from µ0 under g. Since µ0  m2 µ⇤, m2 would block the deviation by the grand
coalition from µ0 to µ⇤.
Let Vg be a vNM stable set based on the dominance relation g. Since g(µ⇤) = ;, external
stability requires µ⇤ 2 Vg. For every matching µ 2M\ {µ⇤, µ0, {(m2, w1)}}, it holds that
µ⇤ 2 g(µ), so in order not to violate internal stability, µ /2 Vg. Since g(µ0) = {{(m1, w1)}}
and {(m1, w1)} /2 Vg, it holds that µ0 2 Vg by external stability. Since µ0 2 g({(m2, w1)}),
it follows that Vg = {µ⇤, µ0}.
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The fact that µ0 belongs to Vg is problematic. The only myopic improvement from µ0
is given by the matching {(m1, w1)}. Since {(m1, w1)} does not belong to Vg, one needs µ0
to be part of Vg in order to satisfy external stability. However, starting from the matching
{(m1, w1)}, there is only one further myopic improvement, i.e. to µ⇤, and from µ⇤ there
are no further myopic improvements. Given a matching µ0, one would therefore expect to
end up in µ⇤, which is part of Vg, and µ0 should not be regarded as stable.
When using the dominance relation h in Definition 1, the sets {µ⇤} and {µ⇤, µ0} would
not qualify as stable sets. Denoting the matching where every individual is unmatched by
µ;, we have that µ⇤ /2 h(µ;) and µ0 /2 h(µ;), so external stability would be violated.
Let Vh be a vNM stable set based on the dominance relation h. Since h(µ⇤) = ;, external
stability requires µ⇤ 2 Vh. Since µ⇤ 2 h({(m1, w1)}) and µ⇤ 2 h({(m2, w2)}), it follows
from internal stability that {(m1, w1)} /2 Vh and {(m2, w2)} /2 Vh.
Since h(µ0) = {{(m1, w1)}} and {(m1, w1)} /2 Vh, it follows from external stability that
µ0 2 Vh.
Since h(µ;) = {{(m1, w1)}, {(m2, w2)}} and {(m1, w1)}, {(m2, w2)} /2 Vh, external sta-
bility requires that µ; 2 Vh.
Finally, since µ0 2 h({(m1, w2)}) and µ0 2 h({(m2, w1)}), it follows from internal sta-
bility that {(m1, w2)} /2 Vh and {(m2, w1)} /2 Vh.
We reach the conclusion that Vh = {µ⇤, µ0, µ;} is the unique vNM stable set based on
the dominance relation h. Since µ; is the worst matching for all individuals, this is a highly
undesirable conclusion. 2
Example 1 shows that the assumption of coalitional sovereignty a↵ects the vNM stable
set. Also, under coalitional sovereignty, it matters whether blocking coalitions can be of
any size or is blocking is restricted to pairwise deviations. The reason for this di↵erence is
that external stability requires each matching not in the stable set to be directly dominated
by an element in the stable set. If a matching µ is dominated by another matching µ0 via
a coalition S of cardinality greater than two, then it may not be the case that µ0 can be
enforced from µ by an individual or a pair.
Rather than requiring direct domination, it should be su cient for external stability
that there is a sequence of matchings, each matching in the sequence dominating the
previous one, that ultimately reaches a matching in the stable set. Indeed, if a matching
that is not in the stable set is blocked by some coalition and the resulting matching is not
stable itself, then further improvements will take place. We make a similar requirement
for testing internal stability. That is, if a matching belongs to the stable set, then there
should be no sequence of matchings, each matching in the sequence being dominated by
the next one that ultimately reaches another matching in the stable set.
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Let some µ 2M be given. The set
h2(µ) = h(h(µ)) = {µ00 2M | 9µ0 2 h(µ) such that µ00 2 h(µ0)}
consists of those matchings that can be reached by a composition of two pairwise myopic
improvements starting at µ. We extend this definition and, for k 2 N, we define hk(µ)
as those matchings that can be reached from µ by a composition of k pairwise myopic
improvements. Since the set M is finite, it follows that for some k0 2 N, for every k   k0,
for every µ 2M, hk(µ) = hk0(µ). The resulting relation is called the transitive closure of
h and is denoted by h1.
Definition 2. A set of matchings V ⇢M is a pairwise myopic vNM set if it satisfies:
(i) Pairwise myopic internal stability: For every µ, µ0 2 V , it holds that µ0 62 h1(µ).
(ii) Pairwise myopic external stability: For every µ 2M\V , it holds that h1(µ)\V 6= ;.
Condition (i) of Definition 2 corresponds to pairwise myopic internal stability. For any
two matchings µ and µ0 in the pairwise myopic vNM set V it does not hold that there is
a sequence of myopic improvements from one to the other. Condition (ii) of Definition 2
expresses pairwise myopic external stability. For every matching µ outside the pairwise
myopic vNM set V it holds that there is µ0 2 V and a sequence of matchings µ0, . . . , µk0
with µ0 = µ and µk0 = µ0 such that, for every k 2 {0, . . . , k0   1}, µk+1 2 h(µk).
The definition of a pairwise myopic vNM set is equivalent to the definition of a general-
ized stable set for abstract systems as introduced in van Deemen (1991), when we consider
the abstract system (M, h). It corresponds to the stable set with respect to path dominance
in Page and Wooders (2009) when h is taken to be the direct dominance relation.
Theorem 1. A set of matchings is a pairwise myopic vNM set if and only if it is equal to
the core.
Proof. We start with the “if” part of the proof and show that the core C is a pairwise
myopic vNM set.
Let some µ 2 C be given. It holds by definition of the core that f(µ) = ;. Since
h(µ) ⇢ f(µ), it follows that h(µ) = ;. Pairwise myopic internal stability follows.
Let some µ 2M\ C be given. We have to show that h1(µ) \ C 6= ;. It follows from
Theorem in Roth and Vande Vate (1990) that h1(µ) contains a stable matching. Since
a stable matching belongs to C by Theorem 3.3 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990), pairwise
myopic external stability follows.
We continue with the “only if” part of the proof and show that C is the only pairwise
myopic vNM set. Let V be a pairwise myopic vNM set. For every µ 2 C it holds that
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h(µ) ⇢ f(µ) = ;. Since V satisfies pairwise myopic external stability, it follows that
C ⇢ V .
Suppose V \C 6= ;. Let some µ0 2 V \C be given. Combining again Theorem in Roth
and Vande Vate (1990) and Theorem 3.3 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990), it follows that
h1(µ0) \ C 6= ;, so therefore h1(µ0) \ V 6= ;, thereby violating pairwise myopic internal
stability. Consequently, it holds that V \ C = ;.
Knuth (1976) observes that the process of allowing blocking pairs to form may lead
to cycles of blocking pairs and then may not lead to a stable matching. By means of an
example, Knuth (1976) raises the question of whether, for any preferences of the agents,
there exists at least one path from any matching to a stable matching. Theorem of Roth
and Vande Vate (1990) resolves this question and proposes a family of random processes,
beginning from an arbitrary matching and selecting a blocking pair at random to create
a new matching, that will reach a stable matching with probability one. In the proof of
Theorem 1, we use the result by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) to prove that pairwise myopic
external stability follows and that the core is the unique pairwise myopic vNM set.
An alternative to the pairwise myopic vNM set is to allow a coalition of any size to
form and block, while respecting coalitional sovereignty. We denote the transitive closure
of g by g1.
Definition 3. A set of matchings V ⇢M is a myopic vNM set if it satisfies:
(i) Myopic internal stability: For every µ, µ0 2 V , it holds that µ0 62 g1(µ).
(ii) Myopic external stability: For every µ 2M\ V , it holds that g1(µ) \ V 6= ;.
The definition of a myopic vNM set is equivalent to the definition of a generalized
stable set for abstract systems as introduced in van Deemen (1991), when we consider the
abstract system (M, g) and it corresponds to the stable set with respect to path dominance
in Page and Wooders (2009) when g is taken to be the direct dominance relation. The
next result demonstrates that allowing larger coalitions to form and block does not change
our previous result: the unique myopic vNM stable set in a one-to-one matching market
coincides with the core.
Theorem 2. For every µ 2M it holds that g1(µ) = h1(µ).
Proof. Let some µ 2M be given. Obviously, it holds that h1(µ) ⇢ g1(µ).
To show the converse, it is su cient to show that for every µ 2M, for every µ0 2 g(µ),
there is a sequence µ0, . . . , µk0 such that µ = µ0, µ0 = µk0 and, for every k = 0, . . . , k0   1,
µk+1 2 h(µk).
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Let µ 2M, µ0 2 g(µ), and S 2 N be given such that µ0(S) = S, for every i 2 µ(S)\S,
µ0(i) = i, for every i 2 N \ (S [ µ(S)), µ0(i) = µ(i), and µ0  S µ. The set S can be
partitioned into sets S1 = {i1, . . . , ij0} and S2 = {ij0+1, . . . , i2k0 j0} such that for every
i 2 S1, µ0(i) = i and, for every ik 2 S2 with k  k0, µ0(ik) = ik+k0 j0 . We form the
sequence µ0, . . . , µk0 by defining µk+1 = µk   (ik+1, µ(ik+1)) for every k = 0, . . . , j0  1, and
µk+1 = µk + (ik+1, µ0(ik+1)) for every k = j0, . . . , k0   1. It is easily verified that, for every
k = 0, . . . , k0   1, it holds that µk+1 2 h(µk).
The following result now follows as an easy corollary.
Corollary 1. A set of matchings is a myopic vNM set if and only if it is equal to the core.
In general, the vNM stable set with g as the dominance relation, Vg, is substantially
di↵erent from the vNM stable set with h as the dominance relation, Vh, as shown in
Example 1. However, these di↵erences disappear whenever the external stability as based
on direct dominance is replaced by a condition that allows for a sequence of matchings,
each matching in the sequence being dominated by the next one that ultimately reaches a
matching in the set.
4 Level-1 Farsighted Sets
An alternative to the pairwise myopic vNM set and the myopic vNM set is the pair-
wise myopically stable set as defined in Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2009) for
network formation problems. This concept is equivalent to the level-1 farsighted set of
Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2014), who also define this notion for higher levels
of farsightedness. Their definitions for network formation problems can be adapted in a
straightforward way to one-to-one matching problems.
Definition 4. A set of matchings U ⇢M is a level-1 farsighted set if it satisfies:
(i) Level-1 deterrence of external deviations: For every µ 2 U , h(µ) \ (M\ U) = ;.
(ii) Level-1 external stability: For every µ 2M\ U , it holds that h1(µ) \ U 6= ;.
(iii) Minimality: There is no proper subset of U satisfying Conditions (i) and (ii).
Condition (i) in Definition 4 captures level-1 deterrence of external deviations and re-
quires that there is no pairwise myopic improvement from a matching µ 2 U to a matching
outside U. Condition (ii) requires level-1 external stability and coincides with pairwise my-
opic external stability in Definition 2. It requires that, for every matching µ 2 M \ U
outside the level-1 farsighted set, there exists a sequence of matchings, each matching in
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the sequence being a pairwise myopic improvement of the previous one, that ultimately
reaches a matching in the set. Notice that the set of all matchings M trivially satisfies
Conditions (i) and (ii) in Definition 4. This motivates Condition (iii), the minimality con-
dition. That is, there is no proper subset of U satisfying the first two conditions. As
has also been argued in Myerson and Weibull (2015), minimality can also be viewed as a
requirement of internal stability.
For network formation problems, Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2014) show
that there always exists a unique level-1 farsighted set. It is given by the set consisting
of all networks that belong to closed cycles, so it includes all pairwise stable networks. In
the following, we characterize the level-1 farsighted sets for one-to-one matching problems.
Notice that both the level-1 farsighted set and the pairwise myopic vNM set require level-1
external stability, also called pairwise myopic external stability. On top of this, the level-1
farsighted set requires level-1 deterrence of external deviations and minimality, and the
pairwise myopic vNM set requires pairwise myopic internal stability. We show now that,
for one-to-one matching problems, both solutions concepts coincide with the core.
Theorem 3. A set of matchings is a level-1 farsighted set if and only if it is equal to the
core.
Proof. We show first that the core C is a level-1 farsighted set.
Let some µ 2 C be given. It holds by definition of the core that f(µ) = ;. Since
h(µ) ⇢ f(µ), it follows that h(µ) = ;. Level-1 deterrence of external deviations follows.
Let some µ 2M\C be given. Since level-1 external stability is equivalent to pairwise
myopic external stability, Condition (ii) of Definition 4 follows from Theorem 1.
For every µ 2 C it holds that h(µ) = ;, so h1(µ) = ;. Level-1 external stability
therefore requires C to be a subset of every level-1 farsighted set. It follows that C satisfies
Condition (iii) of Definition 4.
We have shown C to be a level-1 farsighted set. Since we also argued C to be contained
in every level-1 farsighted set in order to satisfy level-1 external stability, the minimality
condition implies it to be the unique level-1 farsighted set.
The notion of a level-1 farsighted set can also be defined when arbitrary coalitional
deviations are allowed for, so by replacing the dominance relation h by the dominance
relation g in Definition 4. Let U ⇢ M be any set of matchings satisfying the alternative
of Definition 4 based on the dominance relation g. Since g(µ) = ; for every µ 2 C, level-1
external stability requires the core C to be contained in U . Since g(µ) = ;, C satisfies
the version of Condition (i) of Definition 4 as based on g. Since h1(µ) ⇢ g1(µ) for every
µ 2 M, Theorem 3 implies that C satisfies Condition (ii) of Definition 4 as based on g.
From minimality, we conclude that U = C.
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5 Conclusion
We propose di↵erent notions of stable sets for one-to-one matching problems that take the
requirement of coalitional sovereignty into account. Coalitional sovereignty means that the
objecting coalition does not have the power to arrange the matchings of agents outside the
coalition. In these new notions of stable sets, the internal and external stability conditions
are formulated using path dominance, following van Deemen (1991) and Page and Wooders
(2009), and motivated by Example 1. If only pairwise deviations are allowed, then path
dominance corresponds to the myopic blocking dynamics introduced by Roth and Vande
Vate (1990) for marriage markets.
We consider both general coalitional deviations as well as pairwise deviations, resulting
in the concepts of myopic vNM set and pairwise myopic vNM set. We obtain a unique
prediction: the matchings that belong to the core. Thus, while Ehlers (2007) has shown
that the set of matchings in the core is a subset of any vNM stable set and may contain
matchings outside the core when the enforceability condition does not respect coalitional
sovereignty, we obtain the same predictions as Roth and Vande Vate (1990) and Jackson
and Watts (2002): both the pairwise myopic vNM set and the myopic vNM set concide
with the core.
We also adapt the level-1 farsighted set of Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2014),
defined for general network formation problems, to one-to-one matching problems. We
again obtain the core as the unique prediction, both when only pairwise deviations are
allowed as well as under general coalitional deviations. Mauleon, Vannetelbosch, and
Vergote (2011) have found the singleton core elements as the stable set prediction under
farsighted behavior of the agents. Here we show that the same conclusion follows if agents
are myopic.
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